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Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School 
District: "Having Your Cake and Eating It 
Too" in Public School Free Speech Cases 
Freedom of expression is one of the more cherished rights 
protected by the Constitution. The right itself is simply stated: 
"Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . ."' Although significant free speech 
cases did not surface until after World War I, the Supreme 
Court has been confronted with a steady stream of these cases 
in the decades that have followed. As would be expected, the 
numerous Supreme Court cases have resulted in a wide variety 
of scholarly analysis and commentary2 
In relatively recent years, free speech in the context of 
public schools has become a hotly litigated issue. When 
analyzing free speech rights "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school en~ironrnent,"~ the Supreme Court 
grants school officials a degree of control over the First 
Amendment rights of students, teachers, and other persons 
within that environment. The discretion school officials have to 
infringe on freedom of expression rights within the school 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. The literature on the First Amendment is enormous. For a small 
sampling of useful literature on the history and scope of freedom of expression 
rights, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political 
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
299 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost 
Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); David M. 
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.  CM. L. REV. 
1205 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U .  PA. L. REV. 591 
(1982); Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment 
Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1974); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic 
Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982); Harry H. 
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936 (1987). 
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969). 
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environment, as interpreted in Planned Parenthood v. Clark 
County School ~is t r ic t ;  is the subject of this note. In Planned 
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted school 
officials rather expansive authority to control freedom of 
expression in school publications, a decision some claim is 
based on "a fundamental misunderstanding" of Supreme Court 
pre~edent.~ 
Part I1 of this note examines the background of free speech 
within the public school environment and the current judicial 
standards governing its control. Part I11 discusses the facts and 
analysis of the Planned Parenthood decision. Part IV focuses on 
the scope of the authority given school officials to control free 
speech in Planned Parenthood and compares this decision with 
related Supreme Court precedents. This note concludes that 
the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood severely curtails 
First Amendment rights. 
A. The Tinker Standard 
The first signXicant Supreme Court decision discussing the 
issue of freedom of expression in public schools was Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School Dis tr id  In Tin- 
ker, a school district's principals passed a regulation that pro- 
hibited students from wearing black armbands on school cam- 
puses.' Three students wore armbands to protest the Vietnam 
war and were suspended until they agreed to  comply with the 
regulation? The students sued the school district and sought 
an injunction against enforcement of the regulation, claiming 
that their First Amendment right to freedom of expression had 
been violated. 
The Court began its discussion with the oft-quoted state- 
ment, "[Ilt can hardly be argued that either students or teach- 
ers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate." However, the Court also 
4. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991). 
5. E-g., id. at 831 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
6. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
7. Id. at 504. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 506. For cases discussing constitutional rights in the public school 
context, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
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. recognized the "need for firming the comprehensive authority 
of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control 
conduct in the  school^."'^ Balancing these potentially conflict- 
ing principles, the Court determined that students could be 
"trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth,"" but that school officials could 
retain discretion t o  maintain order and to prohibit distractions 
when students are at school. 
In reaching this balance, the Supreme Court adopted the 
following standard: a student "may express his opinions, even 
on controversial subjects . . . if he does so without 'materially 
and substantially interferring] with the requirements of appro- 
priate discipline in the operation of the school' and without 
colliding with the rights of others."12 If the student's conduct 
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others," such conduct is not protect- 
ed as constitutional free speech.13 
The language of the Court's opinion strongly suggests that 
this standard would be applied strictly in favor of free speech. 
Prohibiting expression would only be allowed in "carefully re- 
stricted circumstances."14 State-supported schools are "not [to] 
be enclaves of totalitarianism" where students are "regarded as 
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to  
c~mmunicate."'~ Although recognizing a legitimate state pow- 
268 US. 510 (1925). 
10. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
11. Id. at  512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
12. Id. at  513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
13. Id. The reason the school officials in Tinlzer passed the regulation, and 
one of their major arguments before the Court, was that they feared the wearing 
of armbands could potentially cause disorder or disturbances within the school. The 
Supreme Court, however, found this argument unpersuasive and not within the 
standard allowing for speech restrictions. The Court reasoned as follows: 
Id. 
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure 
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the 
majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken . . . that deviates 
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of open- 
ness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence 
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permis- 
sive, often disputatious, society. 
at 508-09 (citations omitted). 
14. Id. at 513. 
15. Id. at  511; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 402 (1923) (reject- 
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er to curtail First Amendment rights because of the unique 
environment of public schools, this dictum in Tinker indicates 
that the Court strongly favors freedom of expression over 
discipline. 
B. Forum Analysis: 
Placing the Tinker Standard in Context 
In subsequent decisions, the Court developed a forum anal- 
ysis to determine when and how the Tinker standard should be 
applied? Under this analysis, two categorical forums, open 
and closed, were developed. The open category can be divided 
into traditional public forums and limited public forums creat- 
ed by government designation. Traditional public forums are 
"places which by long tradition or by government fiat have 
been devoted to assembly and debate," such as streets and 
parks.'? Designated public forums are public places which, 
although normally considered closed forums, have been opened 
by the state "for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity."18 When the state creates a designated public forum, 
it cannot later "enforce certain exclusions" within that forum, 
even "if it was not required to create the forum in the first 
ing the principle that a state may use any means to "foster a homogeneous peo- 
ple"). 
16. Why the Court decided that it needed a context or forum analysis to ap- 
ply the Tinker standard is never fully explained. Indeed, the Tinker standard was 
specifically adapted to be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment." Tinker, 393 U.S. at  506. I t  appears that a specific forum 
already existed; why impose an additional analysis? ~ ~ o s s i b l e  (or maybe the obvi- 
ous) rationale is that, as the Court gradually moved away from strict protection of 
First Amendment rights, the Tinker standard was seen as unduly restrictive. 
Therefore, to dilute Tinker's protections for freedom of expression in the 
schools, barriers were erected to narrow its application. Rather than applying the 
Tinker standard in all public school free speech cases, as the Supreme Court ap- 
parently originally intended, courts must now wait until the plaintiff can success- 
fully jump through additional hoops before Tinker controls the analysis. As ex- 
plained in this note, these barriers or additional hoops significantly curtail Tinker's 
importance and impede First Amendment rights on the school grounds. 
17. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
In Perry, the Perry Education Association (PEA) was allowed access to the inter- 
school mail system and to the teachers' mailboxes in the Perry Township schools 
, 
under a collective bargaining agreement. Rival unions, including Perry Local 
Educators' Association (PLEA), were not allowed this privilege. PLEA claimed that 
PEA'S preferential treatment infringed on their First Amendment and equal protec- 
tion rights and brought suit. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the agreement. 
18. Id. 
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place."19 However, the state may create a designated public 
forum "for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or 
for the discussion of certain  subject^."'^ Such a forum can be 
created by the government's stated policy or its practices." 
Once a designated public forum is created, it is treated like an 
open public forum, limited only by the purpose for which the 
forum was ~reated.~'  
When the Court determines that it is dealing with a tradi- 
tional or designated public forum, it applies strict scrutiny 
when reviewing any exclusions from the forum. "For the State 
to enforce a content-based exclusion" strict scrutiny requires 
the state to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end."23 
The second category includes "[plublic property which is 
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communica- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  These closed forums are "governed by different stan- 
dard~." '~ Rather than applying strict scrutiny, the Court only 
strikes down governmental regulation of such forums if the 
regulation i s  unreasonable. The s ta te  may enforce 
content-based regulations "as long as the regulation on speech 
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."26 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at  46 n.7 (citations omitted). 
21. See infra text accompanying note 43. 
22. The Court later defined limited or designated public forums with more 
precision: 
"[Llimited public forums[]" consist[] primarily of government property 
which the government has opened for use as a place for expressive ac- 
tivity for a limited amount of time, or for a limited class of speakers, or 
for a limited number of topics. In a limited public forum, it is not history 
or tradition, but the government's own acquiescence in the use of the 
property as a forum for expressive activity that tells us that such activity 
is compatible with the uses to which the place is normally put. 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985) (cita- 
tions omitted). 
23. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
The Court limited the compelling state interest test to content-based exclusions 
allowing states to enforce "[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations." Id. at  
46 (emphasis added). For time, place, and manner restrictions, the much lower rea- 
sonableness standard is now applied. 
24. Id. at 46. 
25. Id. 
26. Id.; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at  806 ("Control over access to a 
nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as 
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Because public schools fall within the second or closed 
category:? school officials have more discretion to restrict free 
speech, thus limiting Tinker's dictum that celebrates freedom of 
expres~ion.~~ As long as school officials have not created a des- 
ignated or limited public forum, their regulations and actions 
will be reviewed under the reasonableness standard rather 
than under strict scrutiny.2s When deciding whether a desig- 
nated or limited public forum has been created," the Court 
looks to  the policy or practice of the school to determine wheth- 
er the officials "opened [the forum] for indiscriminate use by 
the general p~blic."~' However, if the forum has not been 
opened, the regulations or policies will be upheld as long as 
they seem reasonably designed to pass the Tinker test. 
C. The Cornelius Test and the Further Weakening 
of Tinker in Hazelwood 
As the Court became more conservative through the Bur- 
ger and Rehnguist years, it moved away from Tinker's strong 
support of free speech and allowed states more authority and 
the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum 
and are viewpoint neutral."). 
27. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1987) ("The 
public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other tradi- 
tional public forums that 'time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assem- 
bly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' " 
(citations omitted)). 
28. Even more disturbing is the degree to  which the forum analysis weakens 
the freedom of expression protections Tinker firmly provided for those in public 
schools. As the Court moves away from strongly protecting First Amendment 
rights, the forum analysis now allows it to give school officials broad discretion in 
regulating speech, just as long as the regulations are reasonable. This is an enor- 
mous retreat from Tinker, which only allowed regulation in "carefully restricted cir- 
cumstances." Tinlzer, 393 U.S. at  513. See supra note 16. 
29. "The reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to a 
non-public forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all 
the surrounding circumstances." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at  809. This language seems to 
give the Court more discretion in finding that the actions and policies of the state 
or school district are reasonable. By drawing on all the surrounding circumstances 
and the purposes for which a restriction was employed, the Court could find that 
almost any restriction was reasonable. 
30. It is not always easy to determine the type of forum with which the 
Court is dealing. "The line between limited public forums and nonpublic forums 
'may blur at the edges,' and is really more in the nature of a continuum than a 
definite demarcation." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quot- 
ing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 US. 114, 
132 (1981)) (citations omitted). 
31. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983). 
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discretion to limit freedom of expression within the school envi- 
ronment. This movement away from Tinker was evidenced by 
the Court's decisions in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Education FundS2 and  Hazelwood School District v. 
KuhlmeierF3 
In Cornelius, the Court condensed earlier opinions and 
formulated a three-pronged test to be applied in free speech 
cases.34 First, the district court must decide whether the 
speech involved is protected by the First Amendment; if not, 
the court "need go no further."35 Second, the court should ap- 
ply the forum analysis to "identify the nature of the forum, 
because the extent to which the Government may limit access 
depends on whether the forum is public or nonpubl i~."~~ Third, 
after the forum type is ascertained, the court must apply the 
requisite standard (reasonableness or strict scrutiny) in assess- 
ing the justifications for excluding plaintiff from the forum.37 
After Cornelius, the Court's decisions involving free speech 
in public schools began to allow more censorship and regulation 
and less freedom of expression. In Hazelwood, the Court inter- 
preted Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'nS8 broadly, giving school officials significant discretion. 
Staff members of a high school newspaper had claimed their 
First Amendment right to free speech was violated when school 
officials censored two articles that were to be printed in the 
ne~spaper .~ '  School officials felt that they should delete the 
articles before the paper was published4' because some of the 
32. 473 US. 788 (1985). 
33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
34. Cornelius involved the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a charity drive 
aimed at federal employees. This fund-raiser is conducted in the federal workplace 
during working hours. Federal employees contribute a substantial amount of money 
to the charitable participants each year. Plaintiffs were not allowed to  participate 
in the CFC because they did not meet the criteria established for such participa- 
tion. They brought suit, claiming their exclusion violated their rights to free speech 
and equal protection. Id. at 790-93. 
35. Id. at 797. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. 460 US. 37 (1983). 
39. Hazelwood, 484 US. at  262-64. The deleted material included an "article 
describ[ing school] students' experiences with pregnancy" and an "article dis- 
cuss[ing] the impact of divorce on students at the school." Id. at  263. 
40. Because the paper was to be published by the end of the year, the school 
oflticials felt that there was not enough time to make the changes necessary to 
print the articles. Therefore, the paper was printed without the objectionable arti- 
cles. The student editors were not informed about the deletion until after the pa- 
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material was "inappropriate for some of the younger stu- 
d e n t ~ , " ~ ~  and some students and parents could possibly be 
identified in some articles discussing sensitive issues.42 
In its forum analysis, the Court held that "school facilities 
may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities 
have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indis- 
criminate use by the general public,' or by some segment of the 
public, such as student  organization^.'"^ No forum is created 
when "the facilities have instead been reserved for other in- 
tended purposes, 'communicative or otherwise,' " and in those 
circumstances "school officials may impose reasonable restric- 
tions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of 
the school community."44 
The Court essentially ignored the Tinker standard, devel- 
oping instead a standard that gives school districts much more 
leverage in limiting free speech within schools.45 The new 
standard allows school officials to control "the style and content 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to  legitimate peda- 
gogical Therefore, as long as a public forum has 
per was published. Id. at 263-64. 
41. Id. 
42. They felt that some of the anonymous students describing their sexual 
activity could be identified in the text. Furthermore, as to the article on divorce, 
the school officials felt it was unfair to allow some of the objectionable remarks 
made by named students about their parents to be printed without giving the par- 
ents an opportunity to respond. Id. 
43. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at  47). 
44. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at  46). The Court said further that the gov- 
ernment does not create a forum by "inaction" or allowing "limited discourse," but 
only by "intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Id. 
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)). 
45. In response to the argument based on the Tinker standard that speech 
can be regulated only if it "materially and substantially interfedes] with the re- 
quirements of appropriate discipline," the Court in Hazelwood stated that the above 
language 'does not, of course, even accurately reflect our holding in Tinker. Fur- 
thermore, the statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker standard to the 
news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper." Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at  269 n.2. Justice B r e ~ a n  (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) 
wrote in his dissenting opinion that the "Court today casts no doubt on Tinker's 
vitality. Instead it erects a taxonomy of school censorship, concluding that Tinker 
applies to one category and not another." Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at  273. The Court also appears to define pedagogical concerns very 
broadly. School officials may exercise control over activities which "may fairly be 
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a 
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members 
and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
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not been created, and provided that the school's restrictions 
reasonably meet this standard, school officials may restrict 
freedom of expression. Against this background, Planned Par- 
enthood was decided. 
A. The Facts 
The Clark County School District authorized its high 
schools to  publish newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic pro- 
grams. These publications were partially funded by revenues 
obtained from entities that advertised in the printed materials. 
The school district maintained a policy that allowed the indi- 
vidual school principals t o  exercise control over the advertising 
they accepted and printed.47 This policy stated that the 
"school reserves the right to deny advertising space to any 
entity that does not serve the best interests of the school, the 
school district and the community."48 
After accepting a wide variety of advertisements from nu- 
merous  group^,'^ the school district declined, on several occa- 
sions, to accept a Planned Parenthood ad~ertisement.~' This 
audiences." Id. at 271. 
47. Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 820 (9th 
Cir. 1991). The policy stated that "[ilf a school publication does accept advertising, 
some categories of advertising may be excluded." For example, schools may decline 
to accept advertisements for "[dlrugs, paraphernalia, or alcoholic beverage[s] . . . 
[which] may be viewed as encouraging action which might endanger the health and 
welfare of students." Id. n.1. Furthermore, advertisements may be excluded if they 
are "libelous, vulgar, racially offensive, factually inaccurate, or of poor production 
quality" or "have explicit sexual content or overtones." Id. The policy also states 
that if "advertising is allowed which promotes one side of a controversial issue, 
advertisements promoting the opposing side of a controversy should be similarly ac- 
cepted." Id. 
48. Id. at 821. 
49. The school district ran ads from "casinos, bars, churches, political candi- 
dates and the United States Army." Id. at 830-31 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
50. The. proposed advertisement read: 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
OF SOUTHERN NEVADA, INC. 
601 South Thirteenth Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 
Routine Gynecological Exams 
Birth Control Methods 
Pregnancy Testing & Verification 
Pregnancy Counseling & Referral 
Id. at 821 n.2. 
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was the only advertisement rejected by the school district.51 
Planned Parenthood then brought suit, claiming that its free 
speech rights had been violated. 
Initially, the district court concluded that a limited public 
forum had been created and that the advertisements should 
have been published. However, the Supreme Court subse- 
quently decided Hazelwood and the district court withdrew its 
initial opinion. On reconsideration, the district court, applying 
Hazelwood, "found that the publications were nonpublic fo- 
r m s "  and that the school's rejections of the advertisements 
were rea~onable.~~ Planned Parenthood appealed, and the 
Ninth Circuit en banc aff"11med.~~ 
B. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning 
In applying the three-pronged Cornelius testF4 the court 
quickly bypassed the first prong because both parties agreed 
that the advertisements were "protected speech under the first 
amendment."55 Therefore, the court moved directly to the sec- 
ond prong-the determination whether the publications were 
public or non-public forums. In examining the "policy and prac- 
t i ~ e " ~ ~  of the school district, the court stressed that "the 
school's intent was the critical factor in the forum calculus ."57 
The court determined that the schools had not intended to 
create a public forum, but rather to maintain the publications 
51. P l a ~ e d  Parenthood submitted the advertisement to be printed in school 
newspapers and athletic programs, but not in yearbooks. One school did publish 
the advertisement. Id. at  821. 
52. Id. The district court's withdrawal of its decision shows the significance of 
Hazelwood. Using earlier precedents (primarily San Diego Comm. Against Registra- 
tion & the Draft (Card) v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)), the dis- 
trict court determined that a limited public forum had been created in the adver- 
tising space of the publications. Because a public forum was created, the school 
district needed to show that a compelling state interest allowed it to exclude the 
P l a ~ e d  Parenthood advertisements. It could not do so. 
However, Hazelwood si-cantly broadened school rights to censor student 
speech (as related to the Tinker standard), which apparently impressed the district 
court enough to cause it to reverse its decision. As previously mentioned, 
Hazelwood involved students and student speech in a classroom. It seems a signs- 
cant jump for a district court to apply the same standard, in the face of much 
more restrictive precedent, to non-student speech in a non-classroom activity. 
53. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 817. 
54. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797; supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
55. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 821. 
56. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
57. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at  823; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at  802. 
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as closed forums.58 Such intent, coupled with the practice of 
"retaining control and requiring prior approval," failed to reveal 
the "requisite 'clear intent to create a public forum' Hazelwood 
requires."59 
The bulk of the forum analysis in the court's opinion fo- 
cused on the policy of the school district, with little discussion 
of the district's practice. The court, in passing, simply stated 
that the school district's "practices were not inconsistent with 
these poli~ies."~~ Planned Parenthood claimed that a "limited 
forum" had been created in the advertisement area of the 
publications6' because the "schools solicited and accepted an 
array of ad~ertising. '~~ The court disregarded this claim and 
stated, "we believe these points misdirect the inquiry, which 
the Supreme Court has instead focused on the schools' in- 
tent."" Therefore, using the intent test discussed in 
Hazelwood, the court centered its attention on the intent of the 
school district and ignored the district's actual practices. 
Having decided that the advertising pages were a non- 
public forum, the court turned to the third prong of the 
Cornelius test: "whether the school's justification for refusing to 
publish Planned Parenthood's advertisement [was] reason- 
able."64 The court found that the justification was reasonable 
for several reasons. First, the schools desired to  remain view- 
point neutral on the "sensitive and controversial issue of family 
plan~~ing. ' '~~ Second, the schools felt, that "parents would ob- 
58. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 823-24. 
59. Id. at 825 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 
(1988)). 
60. Id. at 824. 
61. Id. at 825. 
62. Id. at 826; see supra note 49. 
63. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 826. 
64. Id. at 829. 
65. Id. The Court added that the school district's related justification to 
"avoid being forced to open up their publications for advertisements on both sides 
of the 'pro-life'-'pro-choice' debate" was also legitimate. Id. However, as the dissent 
points out, there may be problems with the finding of the school district's desire to 
remain "viewpoint neutral" on a controversial issue. "[Tlhe school district has made 
no showing that Planned Parenthood's ad would have been more controversial than 
ads from political candidates, churches, casinos and bars." Id. at 842 (Nods, J., 
dissenting). 
Also, it does not seem reasonable to assume that just because the school per- 
mitted a rather generic Planned Parenthood ad in its publications, the community 
would assume that the school district favors or has adopted Planned Parenthood's 
position. Some Supreme Court Justices have acknowledged that they "think that 
secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a 
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ject to  the ad~ertisement."~~ Third, the court stated that the 
reasonableness of the regulation was enhanced when it "consid- 
er[ed] the emotional maturity of the intended audience."67 
Considering these points, the court held that the prohibition of 
the ad was reasonable and upheld the lower court's decision. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Teenage pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, drugs, 
and other similar problems are reaching epidemic proportions 
and are destroying many of America's youth. It is not unrea- 
sonable to assume that nonprofit corporations like Planned 
Parenth0od,6~ which offer "clinical, educational and counseling 
 service^,"^ will continue attempting to reach teenagers by ex- 
ercising First Amendment rights through the most effective 
medium available: the school system. Indeed, many Americans 
believe that granting such organizations this right would pro- 
duce socially desirable results. However, the majority opinion 
in Planned Parenthood does little to advance these rights or 
the values underlying the First Amendment. As the dissent 
points out, "the majority's opinion reflects a judicial mindset 
that, anytime a First Amendment issue can be said to arise out 
of the 'school environment,' decisions of school authorities re- 
stricting protected expression will receive minimal scrutiny."70 
But minimal scrutiny is not adequate when such a cherished 
school does not endorse or support . . . speech that it merely permits on a nondis- 
criminatory basis." Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, 
J., plurality opinion). If the students are Likely to perceive this, is it reasonable to 
say that the parents will not? All of this shows the substantial area within which 
schools may move when limited only by the "reasonableness" standard. 
66. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 829. Again, the dissent has serious 
doubts about this reasoning. "At best, then, the record shows that school authori- 
ties shied away from an ad for family planning services because they feared it 
might be offensive to some people. Such an . . . exclusion based on undifferentiat- 
ed fears plainly offends constitutional norms." Id. at 842 (Norris, J., dissenting); see 
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
67. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at  829 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). Considering the growing rate of sexual adiv- 
ity among high school students these days, this rationale may be unreasonable. I t  
could be argued that given the rate of sexual activity among high school students, 
i t  is reasonable to assume those students are emotionally mature enough to under- 
stand and appreciate information promoting responsible sexual behavior. 
68. Id. at 820. The Planned Parenthood organization involved in this case is 
"affiliated with Planned Parenthood Federation of America." Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 844 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
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right as freedom of expression is involved. 
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Hazelwood runs into 
difficulty when compared to other Supreme Court decisions. 
For example, in Tinker the Supreme Court considered it signifi- 
cant that the school's policy "did not purport to prohibit the 
wearing of all symbols of political or controversial signifi- 
~ a n c e " ; ~ ~  rather, the school prohibited wearing "a particular 
symbol."72 According to the Court, unless a prohibition meets 
the Tinker ~tandard , '~  "the prohibition of expression of one 
particular opinion . . . is not constitutionally permi~sible."~~ 
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Clark County School 
District prohibited a particular advertisement. After indiscrimi- 
nately accepting advertisements from churches, political candi- 
dates, casinos, bars and the United States all of 
which are somewhat controversial or engender differences of 
opinion in varying degrees, the school district disallowed the 
Planned Parenthood ad because of a desire to remain "view- 
point neutral" and to avoid cont rover~y .~~ If this were truly 
the rationale for the school district's decision, then advertise- 
ments from churches and political candidates would not have 
been accepted either. In reality, i t  appears that the school dis- 
trict simply disapproved of Planned Parenthood's material and 
therefore censored the ad. According to the Supreme Court, 
this is unacceptable: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro- 
hibit the expression of an  idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or di~agreeable."~~ 
71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 
(1969). The Court adds that "students in some of the schools wore buttons relating 
to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a 
symbol of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did not extend 
to these." Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
74. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
75. See supra note 49. 
76. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at  829. 
77. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("The government violates 
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the 
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."); id. at  812 ("[Tlhe 
purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular groups may conceal a 
bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers."); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The 'mere desire 
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
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The Ninth Circuit properly found that the school district's 
rejection of the ad was reasonable, even though its analysis is 
not particularly convincing. But a more fundamental problem 
with the opinion is the majority's exclusive focus on policy- 
what it calls intentT8-and its disregard of practice. Under the 
majority's test, as long as school officials have the expressed 
policy to "reserve for themselves broad discretion to control 
content, then they will be deemed to have 'intended' to create a 
nonpublic forum, and their content-based exclusions will escape 
strict s~rutiny."'~ Allowing such broad discretion with minimal 
judicial review "is heresy in First Amendment jurispm- 
den~e."~' 
Emphasizing an organization's policy, so as to ignore its 
actual practice, departs from the methodology of past Supreme 
Court decisions. In Widmar v. Vincent:' members of an evan- 
gelical religious group brought an action to force the University 
of Missouri at Kansas City to allow them to use its facilities?' 
The University had previously allowed many groups, including 
the evangelical religious group,s3 to use its facilities; this prac- 
tice was changed by a regulation prohibiting the use of Univer- 
sity buildings "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching."84 As a result of the exclusion, eleven members of 
the group brought suit, claiming that the University had in- 
fringed on their freedoms of speech and religion, and their 
right to equal p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~  
viewpoint,' or an unsavory subject, does not justify official suppression [of the 
speech]." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
78. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 823. 
79. Id, at 836 (Norris, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
80. Id. (emphasis added). 
81. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
82. The group, called Cornerstone, included Christian students from various 
denominations. Their meetings included "prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and 
discussion of religious views and experiences." Id. at  265 n.2. 
83. In fad, the group had been allowed to meet on the University's campus 
and to  use the facilities from 1973 to 1977. Id. 
84. Id. at  264. The regulation reads, in part, as follows: 
No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) 
may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by 
either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against 
use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious 
teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by 
the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other con- 
struction. 
Id. at  265 n.3. 
85. Id. at 266. 
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The Court concluded that the University's actions had "cre- 
ated a forum generally open for use by student groups."86 As a 
result, discriminations and exclusions pertaining to  that forum 
were reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than the reasonable- 
ness standard.87 Responding to the University's argument 
that its institutional policy was to provide a secular educa- 
tionS8 without promoting religion, the Court stated that such a 
policy "does not exempt its actions from constitutional scruti- 
n ~ . " ~ '  Therefore, the Court reasoned that it must "look[] be- 
yond the University's written policies" and focus on its practic- 
es to determine whether a public forum had been created." 
Because the University's practices, notwithstanding its policy, 
had created a public forum, any exclusion from that forum had 
to  pass strict scrutiny. 
A similar rationale was followed in Southeastern Promo- 
tions v. Conr~d.~' Southeastern Promotions applied to the di- 
rectors of Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium, a municipal the- 
ater, for permission to  show the production Hair. The theater 
directors decided that, the production would "not be in the best 
interest of the community" and rejected the appli~ation.'~ 
Southeastern sought a permanent injunction permitting it to  
use the auditorium, claiming the rejection had abridged its 
First Amendment right to  free speech.93 The district court de- 
nied the injunctive reliefeg4 The court of appeals 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the director's 
rejection of Southeastern's application was an unconstitutional 
act of cens~rship.~' The Court based its decision primarily on 
86. Id. at  267. 
87. The Court used the strict scrutiny standard as established in Perry Educ. 
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See supra text ac- 
companying note 23. The Court stated that the University must "show that its 
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that i t  is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end." Widmar, 454 U.S. at  270. 
88. Widmar, 454 U.S. at  268. 
89. Id. at 270. 
90. See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t  837 morris, J., dissenting). 
91. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
92. Id. at 548. The rejection was based on the fact that the directors had 
heard from outside reports that the production "involved nudity and obscenity on 
stage." Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (ED. T ~ M .  1972). 
The court held that because of the degree of obscenity in the play, i t  was not en- 
titled to First Amendment protection. 
95. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1973). 
96. The primary doctrine used by the Court was the doctrine of prior re- 
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the fact that the directors had the authority to exercise broad 
and unfettered discretion: "Invariably, the Court has felt 
obliged to  condemn systems in which the exercise of such au- 
thority was not bounded by precise and clear standards.'"' 
This condemnation is based on the reasoning "that the danger 
of censorship. . . is too great where officials have unbridled 
discretion over a forum's use."98 
Significantly the Court did not place emphasis on the 
theater's policy that the directors were to review play applica- 
tions and reject those they felt were inappropriate. Because the 
theater had the practice of indiscriminately opening its doors to 
all productions, the city had created a limited public forum, 
and the exclusion of Hair had to pass strict scrutiny.gg In both 
Widmar and Southeastern Promotions, the Court looked beyond 
the written policies of the defendants and focused primarily on 
their actual practices to determine whether an open or limited 
public forum had been created. This type of analysis directly 
contradicts the majority's reasoning in Planned Parenthood. 
The Supreme Court has retreated from the Tinker stan- 
dard which "swept broadly in its protection of students' First 
Amendment rights while its description of exceptional situa- 
tions justifying interference was narrow."100 Hazelwood's dic- 
tum is evidence of this retreat because it gives school districts 
straint. For discussion of this doctrine, see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 
394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); 
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951). 
97. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at  553. 
98. Id. Furthermore, the Court's "distaste for censorship-reflecting the natu- 
ral distaste of a free people-is deep-written in our law." Id. This principle played 
a significant role in a case similar to Planned Parenthood. In Riseman v. School 
Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 148 n.1 (1st Cir. 1971), the court prohibited a policy which 
banned "advertising or promoting the interests of any community or non-school 
agency or organization without the approval of the School Committee." Central to 
the court's decision was that the review policy was vague and overly broad. Such 
discretion does not ensure that the adverse effects of prior restraint will be mini- 
mized.' Id. at 149. For other decisions prohibiting similar policies dealing with 
non-school sponsored publications in high schools because they were overly broad 
and inadequately focused, see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Indeed, one court acknowledged that "[iln the years immediately following Tin- 
ker, the only circuit to approve a regulation allowing broad review and censorship 
of nonschool-sponsored publications was the Second Circuit in Eisner v. Stamford 
Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1971)." Burch, 861 F.2d a t  1156. 
99. See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at  836-37 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
100. Burch, 861 F.2d a t  1153. 
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much more discretion in censoring free speech within the 
school environment and adopts a "broad definition of 
curriculum."101 One district court has stated that "because 
Hazelwood opens the door to significant curtailment of cher- 
ished First Amendment rights, this Court declines to read the 
decision with the breadth its dictum invites."lo2 This particu- 
lar court rationalized its rejection of the Hazelwood dictum by 
reasoning that because educators have significant power to 
limit expression, "courts must avoid enlarging the venues with- 
in which that rationale may legitimately obtain without a clear 
and precise directive."lo3 Planned Parenthood should have fol- 
lowed a similar interpretation of Hazelwood. 
In spite of Planned Parenthood, free speech is not entirely 
dead in the public schools. The Supreme Court still maintains 
that a "limited open forum should be triggered by what a 
school does, not by what it says."lo4 A school district should 
not be able to  "simply declare that it maintains a closed forum" 
because of "some broadly defined educational goal" and then 
"arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored 
[organization] on the basis of its speech content."105 
101. Id. at 1158 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 
(1988)). Hazelwood gives educators "authority over school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
102. Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
103. Id. Romano pointed to an earlier Supreme Court decision as support for 
limiting the interpretation of Hazelwood. In Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853 (1982), a plurality of the Court would have prohibited a policy of withdrawing 
from school libraries books that were considered anti-American, anti-Semitic, or ob- 
scene. Against the claims that the policy served the interests of the community 
and hrthered the desire to transmit community values, the plurality considered 
the violation of constitutional rights more significant. Romano proposed that "Pico 
counsels against broadening Hazelwood's reach. Pico explains that inroads on the 
First Amendment in the name of education are less warranted outside the confines 
of the classroom and its assignments." Romano, 725 F. Supp. at  690. 
This reasoning is especially pertinent to Planned Parenthood. The advertise- 
ments at issue were not solicited in co~ect ion with the classroom; no evidence 
existed that the advertisements had a purpose other than "to enable the school to 
raise revenue to finance" the publications. Phnned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t  824. 
Therefore, the reach of Hazelwood, according to Romano (and possibly Pico), should 
be limited. 
104. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244 (1990) (quoting 130 CONG. 
REC. 19,222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy)). 
105. Id. at  244-45 (quoting Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1078 
(8th Cir. 1989)). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Allowing the Clark County School District to  indiscrimi- 
nately accept advertisements from any entity, with the excep- 
tion of Planned Parenthood, essentially permits the school 
district to unconstitutionally censor materials from the limited 
public forum it has created in its advertising space. Looking to 
the actual practices of the district, as required by the forum 
analysis, it is clear that a limited public forum was established 
in the advertising spaces of the publications involved. Simply 
focusing on the intent of the school district, while turning a 
blind eye t o  its actions, circumvents an essential element of the 
test. If a government organization only needs to  declare an 
intent or policy that it reserves the power to censor any or all 
expression in an open forum (traditional or designated) in order 
to  prompt courts to  review restrictions under a reasonableness 
standard rather than under strict scrutiny, freedom of expres- 
sion is hardly the constitutional right it used to be. Further, 
combining a reasonableness standard of review with a practice 
by the courts of summarily dismissing the actual actions and 
practices of the organization, looking solely t o  the 
organization's policy or intent, gives the state additional power 
to curtail freedom of expression rights. Such "having-your-cake- 
and-eating-it-too" analysis can hardly stand as strong constitu- 
tional precedent. 
Because the schools had created a limited public forum, 
Planned Parenthood's ad should have been accepted along with 
the ads from churches and political candidates. The Planned 
Parenthood ad was no more controversial than the ads that 
were accepted; indeed, many may argue that it is socially use- 
ful. The fact that some people may disagree with Planned 
Parenthood's materials is an insufficient basis for allowing the 
school district to censor the ad. Hazelwood gives school officials 
plenty of discretion to control expression in the school environ- 
ment; the Ninth Circuit should not have expanded this control. 
The right t o  freedom of expression is too vital to permit its 
suppression, even in the public school environment. 
Curtis Anderson 
